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Which Union for Europe’s Capital Markets? 
Karel Lannoo 
The call for a Capital Markets Union has been a useful device to raise awareness about the need for 
more integration in Europe's capital markets. Despite years of harmonising regulation and a single 
currency, Europe’s capital markets remain fragmented. This Policy Brief calls for targeted 
measures to overcome fragmentation, through enhanced enforcement, strengthening of the 
European supervisory authorities, enhanced disclosure and comparability of financial information 
and the mobilisation savings in EU-wide investment funds. 
 
he prospect of Capital Markets Union has raised 
expectations across the board. For some, it 
holds out the promise of easing access to 
finance for SMEs in Europe’s bank-dominated 
financial model. For others, it would help overcome 
fragmentation in Europe’s capital markets and thereby 
create scale and depth. For still others, it would 
provide harmonising elements that have not yet been 
addressed at EU level, such as for securitisation. And 
finally, some view it as a vehicle for creating a 
European SEC for securities markets, which would 
perform an analogous role to that of the ECB for 
banking union. 
The debate about integrating Europe’s capital markets 
is not new, far from it. The first attempt dates back to 
the early 1980s with the harmonisation of public 
offerings and listing particulars. A second wave 
followed with the 1992 programme and the agreement 
on the Investment Services Directive (ISD). By the end 
of the 1990s, in the wake of EMU, a new wave of 
harmonising measures was proposed under the aegis of 
the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), with the 
ambition to increase growth and reduce funding costs. 
The centrepiece was the 2004 Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID), but it also contained 
measures regulating disclosure and market 
manipulation. The financial and sovereign crises have 
led to the latest wave of measures, with EMIR 
(European Market Infrastructure Regulation) and an 
upgrade of MiFID, inter alia. 
But despite years of harmonising regulation and a 
single currency, Europe’s capital markets remain 
fragmented. Many market operators continue to be 
vertically integrated, few new EU-wide structures have 
emerged over the last decade and the most powerful 
intermediaries are often of US parentage. Europe has 
struggled for years to create a decent capital market as 
an alternative to the dominant model of bank 
financing, but the financial crisis has impoverished and 
re-fragmented the landscape. This led the President of 
the European Commission to call for Capital Markets 
Union, as part of his priorities for the next five years, 
in his maiden speech to the European Parliament on 16 
July 2014. 
This paper aims to help to focus the debate. It starts 
with a discussion of the essential components of 
capital markets. A second section compares the size of 
the different segments of capital markets in the EU and 
its member states with other countries, mostly the US. 
A third section looks at efficiency indicators of capital 
markets and the cost of fragmentation. A fourth section 
discusses some policy priorities. We draw heavily on 
the extensive work undertaken by both CEPS and 
ECMI on this subject since the mid-1990s. Some 
notable titles include: Capital Markets and EMU 
(CEPS Task Force, Chair Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa, 
1999), Does Europe Need an SEC? (ECMI Occasional 
Paper, 2001), Europe’s Hidden Capital Markets (CEPS 
Task Force Report, 2005), MiFID 2.0 (CEPS-ECMI 
Task Force Report, 2011). 
T
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1. What is a capital market? 
A capital market is easy to define but harder to 
implement – a challenge that the EU itself has also 
experienced over the last 20 years. Compared to bank-
based finance, it is much more difficult to put in place, 
as it requires a very complex and developed structure 
to function efficiently. One could even argue that a 
well-functioning model of a capital market is hard to 
‘export’. No wonder that there are few developed and 
well-functioning capital markets in the world. 
Regulation and self-regulation have a central role in 
allowing markets to function well, which allows the 
best regulated market to have the lowest cost of 
capital. 
A capital market works as a conduit for the demand 
and supply of debt and equity securities. It channels 
money provided by investors and banks to borrowers 
through a variety of instruments, called securities. A 
capital market is not a compact unit, but a system with 
differing degrees of centralisation. In most countries, 
the stock market is centralised, although in the most 
developed markets, fragmentation has grown between 
different trading platforms as a result of deregulation. 
Bond and derivative markets were highly 
decentralised, or functioned under different models – 
mostly bilateral or sometimes centralised in certain 
segments – but a process towards centralisation is 
ongoing as a result of the financial crisis.  
A central problem, analysed at length in the literature, 
is the information asymmetry between issuers and 
investors. Thus, in order to ensure equity and 
efficiency of securities markets, (self-)regulation must 
ensure that a sufficient amount of credible information 
is delivered equally to investors, and that issuers 
receive a correct price for their securities. Much of the 
debate has focused on how to make disclosure by 
issuers work, and on the transparency of the price 
formation in ‘organised markets’. 
The implementation and enforcement of this process 
depend on a complex set of institutions. Not only do 
government bodies play a role, but also self-regulatory 
organisations and ‘reputational intermediaries’ (Black, 
2000). Stock exchanges, investment banks, law firms 
and audit firms put their name at stake when 
participating in an initial public offering (IPO) in 
disseminating information on securities issuers and 
listed enterprises. They will suffer a loss of reputation 
or even counter-claims if they support a bad security 
on the market. A second tier of intermediaries consists 
of investment and pension funds (also called the ‘buy 
side’), which create market demand for securities. The 
financial press acts as opinion-shapers and data 
providers, as repositories of information. The 
intermediaries are controlled by government and/or 
self-regulatory organisations (SROs). The latter can be 
subdivided into voluntary (professional organisations) 
and mandatory (SROs mandated and controlled by 
government) organisations. Intermediaries are liable by 
law for faulty information. Table 1 presents this 
structure schematically. 
Table 1. The different layers of securities markets 
1. Issuers Equity and debt securities 
2. Infrastructure Securities exchanges, settlement 
organisation, central counterparties 
3. Reputational 
intermediaries 
- Investment banks, brokers, analysts, 
auditors, law firms and rating agents 
- Institutional investors (investment 
funds, pension funds, insurance 
companies) 
- Financial press, data providers 
4. Self-regulatory 
organisations 
- Professional federations (analysts) 
- Standard setters (i.e. accounting, 
audit) 
5. Government 
institutions 
- Securities, futures and commodities 
authorities 
- Conduct authorities 
- Courts 
6. Laws Securities law 
Company law 
Consumer law 
 
This structure is highly complex and will require years 
before it can be put in place and becomes fully 
functioning. It requires the different layers of 
institutions to work efficiently. Bad functioning by one 
element of a layer affects the whole chain. Formal 
rules are only a start. Next comes the institutions and 
enforcement, which is the “more difficult task”, 
including direct public enforcement and indirect 
enforcement through the reputational intermediaries 
(Black, 2000, p. 17). 
Compared to the US, which has a long history of 
securities market regulation and two specialised 
federal securities markets supervisors, Europe has 
gone through different waves of harmonisation over 
the last two decades, but apparently not yet with 
convincing success, given the continued need for 
capital markets union. However, when compared to the 
early 1990s, Europe has come a long way, but it is a 
good example of the complexity of building a set of 
institutions to support securities markets. By the end of 
1993, with the launch of the single market and the 
coming into force of the Investment Services Directive 
(ISD), the first real piece of harmonising legislation, 
the member states of the EU had a domestic stock 
market capitalisation of only 43% of GDP, in contrast 
to 77% in Japan and 85% in the US (NYSE and 
NASDAQ).  Excluding the UK, the average stock 
market capitalisation in the EU amounted to 31% of 
GDP. Countries such as Austria, Germany or Italy 
hardly had a stock market worthy of the name, with a 
capitalisation of around 20% of GDP. The second set 
of policy initiative followed in the wake of the start of 
EMU and the dot.com bubble with the Financial 
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Services Action Plan (2001), culminating in the 
adoption of MiFID, which came into force at the end 
of the most recent bubble. 
For emerging markets to create capital markets from 
scratch represents an even more complex task, which 
explains why it is easier to develop bank-intermediated 
financing in the first place, requiring as it does a much 
less complicated institutional and regulatory set-up. 
But a capital markets model also implies that there is a 
huge task in educating issuers and investors in capital 
markets about their rights and obligations. 
Black (2000) sees limited room for ‘piggy-backing’ on 
the reputation of foreign countries. The whole set-up is 
difficult to transpose, in as much as the functioning 
and reputation of the entire structure comes into play. 
The best-run system will have the cheapest costs for 
raising capital. Regulatory competition should thus 
increase standards. Other scholars came to the same 
conclusion (see e.g. Romano, 2001, and also Lannoo 
& Khachaturyan, 2003, for an overview). Opponents 
of regulatory competition argue that markets may not 
be able to properly differentiate between efficient and 
inefficient firms and thereby fail to prevent the 
resources from ending up in the ‘lemons’ market, 
following Akerlof (1970). This may, at EU level, point 
to the need for a stricter enforcement mechanism of 
securities law, analogous with Banking Union, as the 
illusion of a common standard would put the best-run 
markets at a disadvantage. 
2. How do capital markets and its 
segments compare? 
The benchmark for capital markets is the US, which 
has the depth, scale and breath, also for foreign issuers. 
Comparisons can be made for the EU as a bloc, 
although a comparison by member state may give an 
entirely different perspective. Many EU member states 
have developed their markets to a greater extent than 
suggested by the historical data mentioned above. But 
important differences remain between markets that are 
mostly of a structural nature, and that will hamper the 
development of a Union for capital markets. 
Adding up the different components of the core equity 
and debt securities markets, the EU is about one-third 
smaller than the US market (end-2013). Government 
and financial debt securities are comparable in relative 
size, but the big difference lies with the securities 
markets for corporations, in which corporate equity 
and debt securities are twice or more the size than in 
the EU.  
 
Figure 1. Capital markets structure – EU vs US (end December 2013) 
 
Source: ECMI Statistical Package (2014). 
Looking at the situation in individual member states 
reveals important differences. In fact, there is hardly an 
EU model for securities markets, but rather an 
enormous diversity of models. The indebtedness of the 
sovereign can explain one element in the development 
of debt securities markets, but not everything. 
Germany has an underdeveloped market on all 
accounts, whereas the Netherlands and Denmark have 
debt securities markets that equal almost three times 
the national GDP. 
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Figure 2. Stock market capitalisation and outstanding debt securities (end December, 2013) 
 
Source: ECMI Statistical Package (2014). 
The data demonstrate that capital markets in some 
countries are well developed and can, for example, 
respond to the financing needs of SMEs or 
infrastructure. In other cases, an equity market is still 
emerging, and the debt market is dominated by the 
sovereign’s needs. But it also seems to indicate that 
there is limited integration amongst the capital markets 
of the EU member states. Several local factors seem to 
hamper cross-border provision of capital market 
products or prevent competition at EU level.  
The degree of integration, or the remaining 
fragmentation of EU capital markets can be monitored 
in several ways. On an aggregate basis, the ECB has 
tracked integration of EU financial markets over a long 
period of time, using composite price-based and 
quantity-based indicators, and based on a theoretical 
benchmark of a fully integrated market (SYNFINT). 
According to the latest update, published in April 
2014, the price-based indicator shows that market 
integration has declined significantly since the peak of 
2007, and is now at the level of 1999, or the start of 
EMU (ECB, 2014). This means that dispersion among 
a set of indicators covering money, bond, equity and 
banking markets increased markedly with the financial 
crisis, and is now at the same level as 15 years ago. 
The quantity-based indicator, covering cross-border 
holdings of banks (MFIs) with regard to four market 
segments – government and corporate bonds, equity 
and interbank lending –also declined back to the level 
of 1999. The latter indicator shows that at the peak, the 
government and corporate bonds were the most 
integrated, followed by interbank lending, whereas 
equity markets remained significantly less integrated.1 
                                                   
1 See presentation by Mauro Grande (ECB, 2014) on the 
occasion of the launch of the 2014 report (www.ecb.europa.eu/ 
events/conferences/shared/pdf/finintrep_pres.pdf?fc499fd5f7b9
672e75e92b80240d915d). 
3. Efficiency indicators of capital markets 
and operators 
Fragmentation can also be measured by comparing 
price and size indicators, taking the US as the 
benchmark of a more integrated market. General size 
indicators were already given before, but the structural 
differences between both markets have to be taken into 
account. On the basis of a variety of indicators, a 
highly diverse picture emerges, with the EU, or some 
of its member states, doing better than the US in some 
areas, whereas the opposite is the case in others. In 
many of these cases, regulation, or the lack of it, is key 
in explaining the differences. We start with the core 
components of securities markets, followed by capital 
market products and intermediaries. 
In the domain of equity trading, EU markets are very 
competitive, and are trading at bid-ask spreads for the 
‘blue chip’ stocks that are comparable or even better 
than those offered on US markets. As a proxy for the 
competitiveness of securities markets, bid-ask spreads 
narrowed significantly in the EU as a result of a 20-
year process of liberalisation, starting with the EU’s 
Investment Services Directive in 1994. It encouraged 
EU exchanges to invest in electronic trading platforms, 
at a time when the US market was still largely floor-
driven. This happened even if the markets remained 
physically fragmented, i.e. the different markets 
continued to operate in different financial centres but 
were virtually one (see Valiante, 2011, p. 33). 
The same is not true for the debt markets, where large 
bid-ask spreads continue to apply in secondary 
markets, notwithstanding many commitments from 
industry to improve practices. It is now up to the 
implementation of the amendments to the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) to bring 
much needed transparency to bond markets. Until 
today, transparency was not required, and the market 
remained largely in the hands of the wholesale 
operators, with a few exceptions. In the US, by 
comparison, the authorities imposed a trade-reporting 
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engine (called TRACE) also for corporate bond 
markets. 
The fact that overall trading costs continue to diverge 
is related to settlement costs, an element of the market 
that was not opened-up to competition, until recently. 
Even if trading is competitive in the EU, the costly 
settlement of trades make it less attractive, as 
competition among central securities depositories 
(CSDs) was not opened-up. But this situation should 
change now with the CSD Regulation and the arrival 
of Target 2 securities. In this domain, as in bond 
market trading, hesitation by policy-makers to open-up 
markets perpetuated market segregation and costly 
silos. In the US, on the other hand, a single CSD, the 
Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), 
operates as the back office for the entire securities 
market. 
Turning to capital market products, a complex picture 
emerges once again. For investment fund markets, 
Europeans also pay for the cost of fragmentation, with 
an average small size per fund, and thus higher costs 
and lower returns. Europe has a multitude of funds, 
spread over bonds, equity, money markets, mixed and 
specialised funds, and also spread across many 
different providers, which often sell only their own 
funds. The average European mutual fund is valued at 
€222 million, which is one-seventh the size of a typical 
US fund which has on average €1.6 billion in assets 
(see ECMI Statistical Package, 2014). Consequently, 
the total expense ratio, or the costs for managing the 
funds is about 50% higher in Europe than in the US 
with 1.5% as compared to 1% (see EFAMA, 2011 and 
ICI, 2013). This also prevents European funds from 
investing more in large long-term projects, which 
require size to diversify. The recent agreement on 
ELTIF (European Long-Term Investment Funds) will 
not change this picture, on the contrary, it will 
maintain fragmentation in Europe’s fund markets on 
the basis of the type of assets. 
 
Figure 3. Total number and average size of mutual funds in the EU and the US (Q3, 2014)* 
 
*Funds of funds are not included, except for FR, DE, IT, LU. 
Source: EFAMA, International Statistical Release (2015). 
A different picture emerges for pension funds, 
however. Over the last decade (December 2001-June 
2011), the performance of pension funds in the US and 
UK was negative, amongst others as a result of high 
management fees (OECD, 2012). According the 
OECD, countries with large numbers of small funds 
tend to have higher operating costs on average than 
countries with a small number of relatively large 
funds, such as the Netherlands or Denmark. Annual 
management fees, applied yearly to the value of 
accumulated assets, were near 0.13% in the 
Netherlands on average while they exceed 0.70% in 
the United Kingdom. Differences in costs can over 
time lead to substantial differences in benefits, above 
all for long-term investments (De Manuel & Lannoo, 
2013, p. 69, pp. 82-84). 
Both fund examples show that fragmentation has a 
cost, but it is a form of fragmentation that cannot be 
easily overcome. In both cases, national idiosyncrasies 
matter: for investment funds, it is the savings habits of 
households; for pension funds, it is the national 
organisation of the pension funds industry. The status 
quo is only second best, as the picture sketched above 
undermines the trust of households to invest in the 
markets, and long term.  
4. What should the EU do? 
Given the complexity of these challenges, a Capital 
Markets Union programme will be very difficult to 
delineate. Much depends on the level of ambition and 
the objectives pursued. The first priority should be to 
complete the single market to achieve more depth, 
breadth and scale. Considering that many measures 
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were adopted during the financial crisis that create the 
regulatory framework for the different actors in capital 
markets, enforcement is the key task. And that’s where 
the analogy with Banking Union arises. New 
initiatives, or filling gaps in the regulatory framework, 
could be a second priority, but this will depend upon 
the objective: Are new regulatory initiatives required 
to overcome market fragmentation? Or should the 
focus mainly be to broaden funding sources and 
facilitate capital market financing to ease access to 
finance for SMEs? 
Following the G-20 agenda, the financial crisis led to a 
raft of new measures that will also complete the 
regulatory framework for the different players in 
capital markets, as laid out in Table 1. New rules have 
been adopted covering rating agents, infrastructure and 
funds, and amendments have been made to the core 
MiFID provisions covering price transparency, 
intermediaries, data providers, but most of these 
measures are still in the course of implementation, and 
it is too early to examine effects. The most important 
issue at this stage is enforcement, which has been 
strengthened by the creation of ESMA in 2010, and its 
enhanced powers under additional regulatory 
measures. But can ESMA cope, and does the structure 
for cooperation work? This is where the Review of the 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) comes in. 
Enhance ESMA or conduct supervision in the 
EU 
Unlike the EBA (European Banking Authority), which 
has together with Banking Union become a standard 
setter, the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) will continue to combine regulatory and 
supervisory tasks and no drastic change can be 
expected in the near future in its role. The main 
problem is that following the centralisation of 
prudential supervision of banks in the SSM, the 
functional separation of the ESAs in banking, 
insurance and securities markets supervisors may 
prevent closer and more efficient cooperation among 
conduct supervisors at EU level on capital markets 
issues. The structure at member-state level is even 
more complex, with a diversity in the financial 
supervisory models, and sometimes different 
authorities in charge, also as regards capital markets. 
Furthermore, ESAs are overwhelmed by regulatory 
tasks, with the Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) 
and Implementing Technical Standards (ITS), which 
often prevent them from pursuing their supervisory 
tasks, with the limited budget under which they 
function. For example, the powers that ESAs wield 
regarding financial products and consumer/investor 
protection have not been used (Article 9 ESAs 
Regulation). 
 
What could be done? 
 The ESAs are structured too much as coordinating 
authorities, or executive agencies of the European 
Commission, without being given sufficient clout 
over the member states. This is already clear from 
the governance structure, whereby the chair and 
managing director have no vote on the board of 
supervisors. This should be changed.  
 As the regulatory tasks will hopefully soon be 
diminishing, the ESAs should launch some high-
profile, coordinated cross-border actions on 
financial products or practices. However, 
initiatives such as the law suit brought by the UK 
against the powers of ESMA in the Short-Selling 
Directive, which the UK lost, are entirely 
counterproductive. But it indicates the 
unwillingness of member states to see more power 
transferred to the centre, and thus more Union in 
this domain. 
 On the supervisory level, ESMA should have the 
supervisory tasks that it deserves. Allocating 
supervisory tasks in a haphazard way makes no 
sense. So far, ESMA is the unique authority 
supervising Credit Rating Agencies and Trade 
Repositories, but not granting this role in the 
context of the draft benchmark Regulation makes 
no sense, as many critical benchmarks are 
European or global by nature. The same could be 
said for the data monitors under MiFID II. 
 The ESAs’ data collection capacity should be 
enhanced, and member state authorities should 
cooperate more. The experiences with and the 
outcome of the EBAs’ first and second stress tests 
are still fresh. Also the other two ESAs 
experienced data collection problems, and earlier 
initiatives had to be discontinued because of 
limited means. 
In the ongoing ESA Review, the European 
Commission unfortunately did not address these 
matters, although they were discussed by the European 
Parliament in its report on the subject. In essence, the 
Commission report on the ESAs chose to avoid the 
debate on sensitive issues, whereas the EP called for a 
full review of applicable regulations, covering the 
governance and the role of the chair, the powers 
exercised and the rule-making by the ESAs and the 
European Commission, inter alia. 
Does this mean that the EU does not need an SEC if it 
has a Capital Markets Union in place? Most likely not, 
unless action is undertaken to adjust the mandates and 
functioning of the ESAs, and ESMA in particular, in 
response to market needs and policy developments. 
The incapacity to address these matters at the level of 
the ESAs also means that more and more tasks will be 
taken over by the larger and more efficient ECB in the 
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longer run. The ECB has become the supervisor for the 
120 largest banks in the Eurozone and it will become 
the ultimate securities settlement entity under Target 2 
Securities from 2016 for the large majority of the EU 
countries. Also outside the eurozone, it is already 
increasingly collecting statistics on a growing number 
of matters, covering securities markets and funds, but 
mostly limited to the euro area, and is launching 
unconventional monetary policy actions with a direct 
impact on capital markets. 
Revisit the ecosystem of capital markets 
Since Europe remains highly fragmented, with many 
financial centres, big and small, structures need to be 
adapted to this diversity. Capital markets require local 
knowledge, both for the financing needs of sovereign 
states and even more so for local enterprises. 
Exchanges have continued to operate in most member 
states, and act as a local market to respond to funding 
needs, but many smaller market intermediaries and 
brokers have disappeared or been absorbed by larger 
banks. Several larger banks, on the other hand, have 
reduced their capital market activities, or may have to 
spin these off as a result of national or European 
legislation. Hence ‘market-making’ is threatened on 
the supply side on both ends, which exacerbates the 
problem for smaller enterprises.  
Now that most new rules are in place, an assessment 
should be undertaken of how different markets have 
been impacted. A common complaint is that many 
firms have become “too small to comply”. The 
rulemaking at levels 1 and 2 has become so pervasive, 
and the litigation cases so costly, that markets have 
been gripped by a compliance fear. The single 
rulebook led to a race to the top in financial market 
regulation, and concepts such as proportionality and 
adequacy of the new rules have moved to a second tier. 
It is time to make a critical evaluation of the new 
regulatory framework and its impact on capital 
markets in particular – in short an EU Regulatory 
Fitness and Performance (Refit) programme for the 
financial sector. 
Prioritise well-targeted product standardisation 
and harmonisation efforts 
The aim should be to overcome fragmentation by EU-
wide acceptable investment products. High-quality 
standardised ABS, ABCPs, or SME loan pools should 
stimulate market integration, although the memory of 
low quality and opaqueness of such instruments is still 
fresh. An EU-wide long-term retail investment product 
could thus be more successful.  
As indicated earlier, today’s EU investment fund 
market is highly fragmented, and could be considered 
as one of the main factors behind the diversity in EU 
capital markets development. A portable EU-wide 
retail investment product could make an important 
contribution to market integration, and move savings 
into the economy.2 In a context of bank deleveraging 
and de-risking, forms of dis-intermediated finance are 
crucial. Europe today’s lacks EU-wide, well 
diversified and stable investment products. While these 
exist at national level, through life insurance or 
pension fund products, they are unavailable at EU 
level. UCITS, the EU investment fund product, is not 
necessarily the hallmark for a well-diversified 
investment product, and attempts to create an EU-wide 
pension product have failed so far because of the link 
with social and tax policy. 
Re-developing securitisation in the EU, as a way to 
package small or illiquid financial instruments into 
larger more tradable products could be a useful way to 
open-up financial markets. The total volume of 
outstanding securitisation products in the EU today is 
about 1/6 that of the US (AFME, 2014). With a tight 
regulatory framework for rating agents and a new set 
of capital rules for banks for securitised products, 
some progress has been made, but the diversity in the 
underlying company and insolvency law frameworks 
will continue to be a barrier that will require more time 
to overcome.  
Further harmonisation of accounting standards 
should figure high on the agenda. Today, IFRS 
(international financial reporting standards) only apply 
to listed corporations at a consolidated level. The large 
majority of enterprises in the EU report in local GAAP 
(generally accepted accounting principles), which is a 
big impediment for investors as well as for firms to go 
to the markets. Company financial data are not 
comparable from a European perspective, and parallel 
reporting under different standards is burdensome. It is 
confusing for investors, and could thus damage a 
company’s market reputation. In addition, there is no 
EU-wide repository for company financial 
information, but rather a multiple set of repositories, 
each following different data feed formats and 
structures. Attempts to create a European EDGAR 
(Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval), 
the SEC’s company financial information repository, 
were undertaken by CESR (Committee of European 
Securities Regulators), the predecessor of ESMA, but 
were discontinued for cost reasons. The new 
obligations for data providers under MiFID II will not 
fill this gap, as those concern market (price) 
information, or reporting of material information. 
The EU has already announced some initiatives in the 
context of the Juncker investment plan, of which €5 
billion should support risk finance for SMEs (or €75 
billion with the multiplier). These include the 
                                                   
2 As proposed by the CEPS/ECMI Task Force Report, Saving 
for Retirement and Investing for Growth (De Manuel & 
Lannoo, 2013). 
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standardisation of credit information for SMEs, 
amendments to the Prospectus Directive and a private 
placement regime. Industry organisations are currently 
finalising a standardisation proposal for private 
placements, probably the easiest form of market 
financing for SMEs, to allow for mutual recognition in 
the EU. 
Facilitate more market-based finance 
More market-based finance is a key objective from a 
European perspective, but what can more Union do to 
change the funding channels? The debt/equity ratio 
differs widely throughout the EU, as it is influenced by 
a raft of factors, also the degree to which it is 
effectively market-based. Equity is related to corporate 
control, an area where sensitivities are entirely 
different in Europe than in the US. And within Europe, 
many different approaches exist on the control rights 
of equity. Debt finance on the other hand is favoured 
by tax legislation, where again changes or more 
harmonisation will be extremely difficult to pursue, 
even if the case for a more tax-neutral system is 
obvious. 
As indicated before, much work has been done to 
harmonise the framework for market-based finance in 
the EU. Back in the early 1990s, Europe, with some 
exceptions, hardly had a capital market, and the 
development that has taken place in the meantime has 
benefitted from the emergence of a more harmonised 
regulatory framework, certainly for large corporations. 
The adaptations to the Prospectus Directive and the 
Transparency Directive, both adopted in 2004, eased 
capital raising and harmonised information 
requirements, but were mostly adapted for large 
corporations. MiFID I created the Multilateral Trading 
Facilities (MTF) as a second-tier organised market, 
which exchanges have used for their alternative small-
cap markets. The MiFID II (Art. 35) aims for a further 
harmonisation of SME growth markets, but it remains 
to be seen how effective this will be. 
Notwithstanding these rules, SMEs will remain 
discouraged from raising capital or debt directly as a 
result of the high cost, numerous obligations and the 
related fear of litigation. The only market in the EU 
that managed to develop a well-functioning equity 
market for SMEs is the London Stock Exchange with 
the AIM market, with more than 1,000 listings, the 
large majority of which are British, and a total market 
capitalisation of €95 billion (January 2015). The 
alternative segments in the other countries are much 
less developed, even more for debt finance.  
Different public initiatives have been undertaken to 
facilitate access to equity finance for SMEs. At the 
member-state level, this was mostly through seed 
finance or venture capital, but it is much less 
developed than debt finance, and the resources 
committed are very limited.  At EU level, the Juncker 
investment plan has set aside €5 billion for SME 
financing, but this is only a fraction of what was 
committed in the five largest EU countries under 
national programmes (see Infelise, 2014, p. 31).  
Conclusion 
Tackling the lack of integration between member 
states should be the key aim for more Union in 
Europe’s capital markets, but this leads to different 
policy conclusions depending on the perspective. The 
European Commission, and the EU as a whole, will 
thus have a hard time agreeing on priorities. 
From a regulatory perspective, it means primarily 
implementation and enforcement of the new pieces of 
legislation and the amendments that were agreed 
during the crisis. Many of these have completed the 
regulatory framework necessary for a capital market to 
work efficiently. Secondly, it means some targeted 
initiatives, including the pooling of household savings 
in sizeable EU-wide investment funds, further 
harmonisation of accounting standards and related 
repositories for financial information, and possibly 
securitisation. 
From a supervisory perspective, Union means better 
and more coordination of oversight and more specific 
centralised forms of supervision, where needed and 
justified. The inability to move forward in these areas 
will damage the reputation of the EU’s capital market 
as a whole. However, the European Commission, and 
even more so the member states, seem not to be 
willing to allow for better coordination and to give 
more supervisory tasks to the European Supervisory 
Authorities, and even less to provide the budget to do 
this. This lack of resolve will simply mean that the 
ECB will gradually take over more powers in this 
domain, which will certainly not be optimal from a 
single market or financial supervisory perspective. 
Ideally, the EU should gradually move to a twin-peaks 
model of supervision, where conduct of business 
supervision, following the centralisation of prudential 
supervision for the eurozone, becomes more 
coordinated at EU level. This would require closer 
cooperation and work-sharing amongst the ESAs, 
especially given that their budgets are limited.  
From a market perspective, Union requires a more 
European perspective on the part of operators and 
investors than has emerged from the home bias that 
has prevailed so far, and that has been strengthened as 
a result of the sovereign crisis.  
 
  
Which Union for Europe’s Capital Markets? |9 
 
References 
AFME (Association for Financial Markets in Europe) (2014), “AFME Securitisation Data Report”, Third Quarter 
2014, 19 December (www.sifma.org/research/item.aspx?id=8589952453), 
Akerlof, G. (1970), “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, p. 629. 
Black, B. (2000), “The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets”, Working Paper No. 200, Stanford 
Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. 
De Manuel, M. and K. Lannoo (2013), Saving for retirement and investing for growth, CEPS Task Force Report, 
CEPS, Brussels, September. 
Demarigny, F. and C. Clerc (2010), “Transparency Directive Assessment Report”, Mazars. 
ECB (2014), “Financial Market Integration Report”, presented at Joint ECB-EC Conference on Financial 
Integration, Frankfurt, 28 April (www.ecb.europa.eu/events/conferences/shared/pdf/finintrep_pres.pdf? 
fc499fd5f7b9672e75e92b80240d915d). 
ECMI (2014), Statistical Package (www.ceps.eu/book/2014-ecmi-statistical-package). 
EFAMA (2011), “Fund Fees in Europe” (www.efama.org/Publications/Statistics/Other%20Reports/EFAMA_ 
Fund%20Fees%20in%20Europe%202011.pdf). 
European Commission (2014a), Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS), Brussels, August. 
European Commission (2014b), “An Investment Plan for Europe”, Brussels, November.  
European Parliament (2014), Report with recommendations to the Commission on the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) Review, Brussels, February. 
Gros, D. and K. Lannoo (1998), Capital Markets and EMU, CEPS Working Party Report, Chairman Dr Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa, CEPS, Brussels, June.  
Infelisi, F. (2014), “Supporting access to finance by SMEs”, CEPS Policy Brief, CEPS, Brussels, April. 
Investment Company Institute (ICI) (2013), “Average Expense Ratios Paid by Mutual Fund Investors Continued to 
Decline in 2012”, Washington, D.C. (www.ici.org/pressroom/news/13_news_trends_expenses). 
Lannoo, K. and A. Khachaturyan (2003), Disclosure regulation in the EU: The emerging framework, CEPS 
Working Party Report, CEPS, Brussels, October. 
Lannoo, K. (1999), “Does Europe need an SEC?”, Occasional Paper No. 1, European Capital Markets Institute, 
Brussels, November. 
OECD (2012), OECD Pensions Outlook 2012, Paris. 
Romano, R. (2001), “The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation”, Yale Law School Working 
Paper, Yale University, New Haven, CT. 
Valiante, D. and K. Lannoo (2011), MiFID 2.0.: Casting New Light on Europe’s Capital Market, CEPS Task Force 
Report, CEPS Brussels, February. 
 
 
 
About the  European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
 
ECMI  is an  independent, non‐profit organisation created to provide a forum  in which market participants, policy‐
makers and academics alike can exchange ideas and opinions concerning the efficiency, stability, liquidity, integrity, 
fairness and competitiveness of European capital markets and discuss the policy and business  implications of the 
latest market trends.  
 
These exchanges are fuelled by the publications that ECMI researchers regularly produce – including commentaries 
and  research papers,  a  statistical package,  an  annual  report  and  a quarterly newsletter  –  as well  as occasional 
workshops and conferences. ECMI also advises European regulators on policy‐related matters, acts as a focal point 
for  interaction  between  academic  research, market  sentiment  and  the  policy‐making  process,  and  promotes  a 
multidisciplinary and multidimensional approach to the numerous subjects it follows. 
 
ECMI  is managed  and  hosted  by  the  Centre  for  European  Policy  Studies  (CEPS)  in  Brussels.  Its membership  is 
composed of private firms, regulatory authorities and university institutes. 
 
  
 
www.eurocapitalmarkets.org | info@eurocapitalmarkets.org 
Place du Congrès 1 | 1000 Brussels | Tel: + 32 2 229 39 11 | Fax: + 32 2 219 41 51 
 
 
  
About the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
Founded  in Brussels  in 1983,  the Centre  for European Policy Studies  (CEPS)  is among  the most experienced and 
authoritative think tanks operating in the European Union today. CEPS serves as a leading forum for debate on EU 
affairs. Its most distinguishing feature lies in its strong  in‐house research capacity, complemented by an extensive 
network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
 
CEPS’  funding  is  obtained  from  a  variety  of  sources,  including  membership  fees,  project  research,  foundation 
grants, conferences fees, publication sales and an annual grant from the European Commission. 
 
  
 
www.ceps.eu 
 
